[This is the second part. The first part is here. My comments or annotations in square brackets.]
The
possible rejoinder is that Mercado is speaking of diwa, referring to
Filipinos and their worldview. From what I gather this is Mercado’s conception:
He thinks Filipino philosophy is different from what he supposes Western
philosophy is and what he supposes other Eastern philosophies are. Both his
suppositions include the idea that each - Western and Eastern except Filipino - has individual
philosophers and none of diwa. So now I can take this rejoinder into
account as (c) Every Filipino is a philosopher. That is, Filipino philosophy,
conceived of as the worldview of the Filipinos also conceives of all Filipinos
as philosophers by virtue of having a Filipino worldview.
Mercado’s
conception, however, does not exclude the possibility that there may be other
places wherein one may say there is a “philosophy of the people.” Of course,
that would also mean that there does not seem to be any identifiable individual
philosopher. But then again, this is just another way of stating that whatever
that place might be; all the inhabitants of that place are philosophers.
Another
characteristic of Filipino philosophy according to Mercado (1974: 67) is that
Negatively,
the Filipino’s world view is nondualistic. This should not be taken to mean
monism, for monism can mean either an emphasis on the subject (idealism) or an
emphasis on the object. The nondualistic world view or horizon acknowledges the
distinction between object and subject. Positively, the Filipino wants to
harmonize the object and subject
Before
this passage, Mercado introduces this as the “underlying principle” or “leitmotif” of Filipino philosophy. But
how did Mercado determine this? What were his methods? How did he justify it?
In the next section I discuss Mercado’s method in order to deal with these
questions.
TROUBLES WITH MERCADO’S METHOD
To speak of a “philosophy of the
people” as Mercado does, one may readily think of anthropology, sociology and
the other social sciences in determining such. For again, Mercado’s conception of
Filipino philosophy is diwa, the
worldview of the Filipinos. One must use these social sciences in order at the
very least record the worldview of the Filipinos. I will not touch upon the
methodological problems in determining what a significant sample of Filipinos
is for determining what a “philosophy of the people” would be. But this is an
issue that cannot really be ignored for what
if there are significantly different worldviews for Filipinos as a whole?
How can one say that such a sample is a representative sample of the “philosophy
of the people”?
Mercado
(1977: 6-9; 1985: 63-4) contends that it is in analyzing the language that one
finds the worldview of the native speakers of such a language. Mercado
justifies his use of “metalinguistic” analysis in this view of language. His
analogy and justification with this view of language is by claiming that
Aristotle would have had different categories if he used a different language.
This is highly problematic4.
Mercado’s
work is therefore, replete with examples culled from the dialects of the
Philippines and his analyzing them. Mercado, perhaps aware of the problem of
what a significant sample is, further qualifies that he used this kind of
analysis with the three largest spoken Philippine languages. Mercado (1985: 64) adds further support for
his method of analysis by writing that:
The reports received were positive.
For instance, one professor from the University of the Philippines
intentionally did not read my writings, but tried a statistical approach to discovering
the Filipino psyche. After reading my works later, she wrote that the facts
obtained through the metalinguistic approach had paralleled her findings
through the statistical approach.
I
do not know in what way this professor’s work “paralleled” Mercado’s work.
Mercado simply states that it does.
In a reworking of his 1985 article
Mercado5 (n.d.) writes that
the meanings of words are
not sufficiently reflected in a dictionary: the nuances of terms have to be verified
in a people's practices and beliefs. That is why the phenomenology of behavior
is a complementary method which may confirm the findings of the first method.
So
what is a phenomenology of behavior? One may well remember that phenomenology
deals with the first person point of view (subjective)[Maybe I should have put starts from. But Mercado is trying to drive at the first person point of view.] . One may
also add that the behavior here might refer to the third person point of view
(objective) or more strongly as the denial of the subjective by Skinnerian
behaviorism. In this view there is a problem of reconciling subjective and
objective with this kind of analysis6. But what does Mercado (1977:
11-2; 1985: 64-66) mean by “phenomenology of behavior”? Basically, it is the
use of phenomenology (in the typical first person point of view) on the results
gathered by social scientists. This may very well translate as: the personal
insights of the inquirer (thoughts about the data) and the results of the
social scientists (data). Mercado (n.d.)7 justifies his approach by
saying that:
However, one philosopher cannot have
the first-hand experience of everything. Where such data is wanting, s/he
therefore has to rely on the findings of other social scientists. The use of
anthropological data is by no means to equate them with philosophy (or
theology), as some critics may imply. Phenomenology is a methodology, while
philosophy is the result of the methodology used.
The problem here is that
just about anyone can have some insights about such data. The issue skirted
here is how such insights are valid and philosophical. To say, against critics
who think Mercado is doing anthropology, that “philosophy is the result of the
methodology used” is either a truism or presumes
that anyone with insights developed
from anthropological data has philosophical
insights.
This presumption is
problematic because practictioners of the disciplines in the social sciences, for
examples, anthropologists, sociologists, psychologists etc., do provide
insights with the data that they have gathered. Social scientists do this at
conferences, seminars and dissertations. So does that make the social
scientists’ insights automatically philosophical? But then again, on Mercado’s
terms, if these were Filipino social scientists then they would be
philosophical. So why not just have any
Filipino look into anthropological data? Mercado (n.d.) in the next
sentence implicitly and perhaps unwittingly answers this by writing that, “One
check of its validity is its consistency of explanation as well its ability to
predict future phenomena.” Is it not the job of social scientists to validate the
“consistency of explanation” and to determine the “ability to predict future
phenomena”?